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On the Subject of Goethe
Hermann von Helmholtz on Goethe and Scientific Objectivity∗
Dani Hallet†
In their recent book, Objectivity, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison
oppose the image of the scientist as a rational, objective, and
dispassionate investigator of nature with that of the intuitively
guided and emotionally volatile artistic genius. The authors argue
that the emergence of objectivity as an epistemic virtue in
nineteenth-century scientific practices was intimately tied to a
newly perceived threat to knowledge: that of the subjective self.
In their discussion, Daston and Galison cite the artist’s creative
imposition of ideas on the world as quintessentially subjective and
opposed to science.
This paper will examine Hermann von Helmholtz’s conception of the
virtuous scientist, focusing primarily on two papers written on the subject
of Goethe’s scientific work and its relation to science proper. In working
out a coherent picture of Helmholtz’s scientific and epistemological
commitments, it will become apparent that his guiding image of the
virtuous scientist did not map onto the scientific personas described by
Daston and Galison. The particular position occupied by Helmholtz brings
into question their claims that structural objectivity arose in response to
the failings of mechanical objectivity, and that the opposition between the
objective and subjective can be characterized as one between passive and
active research methods.
I. PRELIMINARIES AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF OBJECTIVITY
In 1853 Hermann von Helmholtz wrote disparagingly of Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe’s scientific investigations: “Instead of trying to
arrange the phenomena of nature under definite conceptions, independent
of intuition, he sits down to contemplate them as he would a work of
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art, complete in itself, and certain to yield up its central idea, sooner or
later, to a sufficiently susceptible student” (Helmholtz 1853, 46). What
did Helmholtz mean by this and why was he, one of Germany’s most
prestigious scientists at the time, concerned with the scientific researches
of one who, as he himself claimed, was first and foremost, a poet?
(Helmholtz 1853, 45). The meaning of this question is the question of this
paper. As we will see, the reasons for Helmholtz’s concerns are complex
and multifaceted. The “ghost of Goethe”1 cast its shadow over several
mid-century scientists who sought to instate a new era of experimental
science in German universities and differentiate themselves from the
science of the previous generation. For the purposes of this paper I
take Helmholtz’s concerns about Goethe to be indicative of a particular
conception of how to do science properly which took the artist– exemplified
by Goethe–as their point of departure. In this paper I will show how
Helmholtz’s concerns over what he considered an artistic approach to
nature reveal insights into how he conceived of the properly objective,
scientific approach to investigations of nature. He was not alone in his
particular framing of the purposes and methods of science and he did
not stand alone in his characterization of Goethe as a potential threat to
experimental science. I will use his conceptions of the artist and of the
scientist to motivate concerns about the history of objectivity as offered
by Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison in their recent book, Objectivity
(2007). I will argue that the various threats to objective knowledge that
nineteenth-century scientists were responding to cannot be characterized
simply under the rubric of a passive scientific subject and that the history
of objectivity cannot, in the first instance, be understood as a response to
the threat of an active, subjective self.
In Objectivity, the authors contrast nineteenth-century
conceptualizations of the scientist as a rational, objective, and
dispassionate investigator of nature with those of the intuitively guided and
emotionally volatile artistic genius. According to the authors, epistemic
virtues2 like objectivity, understood as internalized norms that guide
investigative practices, arise out of epistemic anxieties–worries about the
certainty or truthfulness of knowledge (Daston and Galison 2007, 49). The
authors argue that the emergence of objectivity as an “epistemic virtue” in
nineteenth-century science was intimately tied to a newly perceived threat
to knowledge–that of the subjective self (191-251). In their discussion
1This phrase is borrowed from the title of Nicholas Jardine’s 1997 paper “ The Mantle of
M’́uller and the Ghost of Goethe: Interactions between the Sciences and Their Histories.”
2“Epistemic virtues” as employed by the authors are “norms that are internalized
and enforced by appeal to ethical values, as well as to pragmatic efficacy in securing
knowledge.”(Daston and Galison 2007, 40-41)
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of the threat from subjectivity, Daston and Galison contrast the artist’s
creative imposition of ideas on the represented world with the scientific
investigation of nature, which aimed at removing the subject from the
processes of inquiry and instead let nature “speak for herself” (191-251).
They claim that the artist was understood at the time to be an extreme
form of a more general wilful self that had been made possible by Kantian
philosophy. This Kantian subject was understood according to a model in
which the self was arranged around an active will and possessed ideas
that it imposed upon nature.
The scientist’s solution to anxieties about subjectivity was mechanical
objectivity–an epistemic virtue that aimed at eliminating the influence of
the self upon the object of investigation. Various practices were involved
in realizing this ideal: using photography instead of drawing, refraining
from manipulating data sets, and abstaining from commentary on images.
By adopting the ideal of objective knowledge as their goal and engaging
in these practices, Daston and Galison argue that nineteenth-century
scientists were positioned against artists who strove to insert their
subjective biases into their representations of nature (245-46). The ideal of
mechanical objectivity contributed to the rise of a new epistemic virtue–that
of structural objectivity (Daston and Galison 2007, 250). Mechanical
objectivity required that scientists present their observations and data
without interpretation, allowing the particular facts to speak for themselves.
Before too long it was realized that particulars could not, on their own,
stand for an entire class of entities, much less lead to laws of nature
with broad scope. Structural objectivity was intended to bring investigation
away from particulars and into an enduring world of persistent relations,
be they logical, syntactical, mathematical, or systems of sensory signs.
Scientists and philosophers saw in formal systems of invariant relations
a way of guaranteeing the ability to share knowledge. This satisfied the
new requirement for objectivity, which de-emphasized the requirement of
an accurate portrayal of nature and put the onus on communicability.
In adopting the ideal of structural objectivity scientists sought
assurance of objective validity in structural relations between phenomena
that held invariantly for all rational investigators over all times. Daston and
Galison trace this notion of objectivity to Kant’s notion of Mittheilbarkeit
(communicability) as it appears at the end of the first Critique, “on the
grounds that if a judgement can be communicated to other rational beings,
there is a solid (though not infallible) presumption that they are talking, and
talking accurately, about the same object” (262). Thus, according to the
authors, Kantian philosophy offered simultaneously both the conceptual
materials for a willful subjective self and the possibility of objective
knowledge. Daston and Galison offer this characterization as one that
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could be, and was in fact, read from Kant. Its value as an interpretation of
Kantian philosophy is tangential to the argument presented in this paper.3
In interpreting the history of objectivity I am concerned with whether
this vision of Kantian philosophy, with its emphasis on communicability,
was adopted and endorsed by nineteenth-century thinkers. Daston and
Galison argue that this was the case and that part of the drive to
embrace this notion of objectivity was the “vertiginous violence” that came
with the nineteenth-century boom in sensory physiology, experimental
psychology, and the burgeoning social sciences. This swell of research
revealed new disparities across the perceptual and cognitive processes
between individuals, and across situations, leading to worries about
shared experience and shared knowledge (Daston and Galison 2007,
256). The subjectivity threat countered by structural objectivity was that of
a scientific self cloistered and sealed in a solipsistic fortress (Daston and
Galison 2007, 267). Structural objectivity was a move away from the ideal
of interpretation-free representations of nature and toward the construction
of abstract systems that would be valid, in the words of Max Planck, for
scientists “of all places, all times, all peoples, all cultures” (Daston and
Galison 2007, 254).
According to Daston and Galison, these two notions of objectivity,
structural and mechanical, followed on the heels of an out-going
eighteenth-century ethos which they call “truth-to-nature,” that took the
world of phenomena to be rich with ideas that must be sought out and
interpreted by the active scientific mind (59-63). The basic idea was
that nature was patterned according to archetypes that lingered latent
below the surface of transitory and seemingly chaotic particulars. The
scientist committed to this ethic saw nature as presenting a deceptive
front that required careful probing to obtain a truthful interpretation of
natural phenomena. These eighteenth-century scientists worried about
a passive self being taken in and tricked by a coquettish nature. Both
mechanical and structural objectivity are positioned against this ethic in
Daston and Galison’s account insofar as the properly objective scientist
is understood as a passive or non-interventionist observer and the
truth-to-nature scientist an active interpreter (203, 223-31). The ambition
of this paper is to add some details to this brief history of objectivity, details
which will require us to reconsider certain aspects of the argument in
3This reading emphasizes communicability as a hallmark of objectivity and does not
commit itself to the formal structures of knowledge that Kant thought grounded and made
possible objectivity. It allows for a wide variety of epistemic codes to be characterized
as broadly Kantian in their commitment to structures and communicability more generally
speaking without taking on the whole architectonic of transcendental philosophy. It should
not be mistaken as the considered philosophical views on Kant of the authors or the
scientists in question.
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Daston and Galison’s book. As mentioned, for this purpose I will look to
one of Germany’s leading and most prolific nineteenth-century scientists:
Hermann von Helmholtz. It is unsurprising that Helmholtz appears in two
sections of Objectivity, as he was arguably Germany’s most prominent
scientist in the nineteenth century, and wrote widely on a variety of
scientific and philosophical topics. Daston and Galison open their chapter
on structural objectivity with an account of Helmholtz’s sign theory of
sensation as a precursor to the positivist theories of structural objectivity
that would follow at the turn of the twentieth century. They also employ
Helmhotlz in another chapter discussing the scientific subject. In serving
in these roles he appears in two different lights: as a scientist committed
to structural objectivity, and as scientist worried about the imposition of
a willing self on scientific knowledge. These roles are not prima facie
disparate, but as we will see, a fuller appreciation of the concerns that
motivated his set of epistemic virtues will lead to some puzzling questions
about Daston and Galison’s account of objectivity. The concerns I wish to
focus upon may be approached by looking at two papers Helmholtz wrote
on the scientific work of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: “On the Scientific
Researches of Goethe” (1853) and “Goethe’s Anticipation of Subsequent
Scientific Ideas” (1892). Both papers addressed the question of what
constituted proper science by opposing it to art in the context of Goethe’s
work in morphology, botany, and optics. I will supplement the Goethe
papers with some of Helmholtz’s scientific and epistemological writings,
in order to question Daston and Galison’s claim that objectivity arose in
the nineteenth century in response to anxieties centered on a passivity or
an activity of the scientific self. I take Helmholtz’s views to be relevant to
this topic insofar as his views on science were widely influential well into
the twentieth century. A close look at his worries about Goethe can reveal
the details of one instance of the oft assumed dichotomy between art and
science. In doing so I hope to suggest that the boundaries of disciplines,
especially the methodological ones, do not simply follow from definitions
of their projects, rather their projects and methods are articulated through
discourses and practices that often differentiate themselves in relation to
conceptions of other practices within specific political and cultural contexts.
II. THE EYES OF GOETHE
In 1853 Helmholtz argued that Goethe’s work was not properly
scientific because he looked at nature with the intuitive eyes of the artist,
which led to two inexcusable faults: 1) failing to grasp causal relations, and
2) neglecting to articulate precise and definite theories. Science was in
the business of coming up with laws, and scientific laws, to Helmholtz’s
mind, were highly generalized formulas that specified in precise terms the
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invariant causal relations between phenomena. His criticisms of Goethe
culminated in the accusation that “he saw by happy chance that there was
a law, and he followed up the indications of it with great shrewdness. But
what law it was, he did not see; nor did he even try to find it out” (Helmholtz
1853, 49). Which is to say, in the context of a discussion of the artist’s
morphological studies, that Goethe failed to seek the causal connections
behind common morphological structures in a properly experimentally
rigorous way. Helmholtz advocated an “experimental interactionist”4
conception of science, in which one began with generalizations about
experience and then manipulated variables to see what remained constant
over varying experimental conditions, refining the initial hypothesis until it
was a precise expression of the unexceptional relations behind a broad
and well-defined domain of objects. Laws were simply more generalized
facts. In an 1862 paper, “The Facts in Perception,” the facts were the
“observable lawlike relationships between [the] appearances” (Helmholtz
1878, 141). These factual or lawful relations were objective because they
reflected the structure of those elements of phenomena that did not vary
under changing conditions–experimental, inter-subjective or otherwise.
Objective knowledge may have been so in virtue of the structures of
“the actual” world but, epistemologically speaking, it was signaled by its
ability to be communicated intersubjectively over time, that is, invariably.
Objective knowledge of the relational structures of phenomena was not
something that one could simply take as given in describing things
haphazardly. One knew they had such knowledge when it was clearly
communicable across a variety of subjects and a range of situations. It
was not in virtue of being incommunicable that a piece of knowledge was
not objective, but if it was non-communicable over some instances and
persons there was a good chance that it was not an objective fact.
The standard for precision was set by mathematicized laws like those
in Newtonian physics or the measurable wavelengths in Helmholtz’s
“Physiological Causes of Harmony in Music” (1857). These were highly
communicable formulations that everyone, if given the requisite training,
could understand. Helmholtz contrasted this with the elitist je ne sais
quoi of artistic insight. He encouraged the reader to try to define
scientifically the leaf-like appendage of Goethe’s Urpflanze,5 arguing that
at best one can make a vacuous statement about the parts of flowers
being “lateral appendages of the axis [. . . ] to see this does not require
4I have taken this description of Helmholtz’s position in the philosophy of science from
Heidelberger 1994.
5The Urpflanze was Goethe’s notion of an archetypal plant form upon which all species
of plants were derived. It was, for him, an idea that existed in nature that was not strictly
ideal but observable to those with adequate observational abilities.
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Goethe” (Helmholtz 1853, 47). The point is supposed to be that attempts
to systematically define the Urpflanze resulted in ludicrous, vacuous
statements about stems and stalks. As soon as one tried to communicate
what was meant by the Urpflanze it became clear that one was not
talking about something that could be referred to in scientific discourse–it
was either nonsense or outside the domain of science. The ineffability of
Goethe’s intuitions disallowed the sharing of his insights in a way that
promoted subsequent investigations. Lacking the capacity to be equally
understood by members of the scientific community, this kind of intuitive
knowledge could not possibly be properly objective.6 Goethe’s failure to
develop exact, communicable, causal explanations for natural phenomena
made him an inadequate scientist and this, Helmholtz maintained in 1853,
was a function of his artistic character.
However, Helmholtz did not understand Goethe to be an impetuous,
recklessly passionate romantic, a caricature too often associated with
Romanticism for reasons too complex to discuss here. Rather, he saw in
the poet’s work a reluctance to probe nature and a preference instead for
passive observation. He saw this reluctance to probe nature especially in
the poet’s optical work and characterized Goethe’s rejection of Newtonian
theory as a battle in a larger war against experimental methods (Helmholtz
1853, 46). Unlike certain understandings of artistic intuition as an active
creative process, Helmholtz took it to be a form of passive cognition
(Hatfield 1991, 197). He claimed that the epiphany at Lido in which
Goethe first grasped the Urtypus was a typical instance of passive artistic
intuition (Helmholtz 1853, 38; 1892, 488). Passivity, however, did not entail
deception. In the same way that we can recognize proper grammatical
constructions without knowing the explicit rules involved, so too could art
present generalizations recognizable as true of our experience.7 However,
the process by which these intuitive truths were grasped was not available
to reflection and was not explicitly and actively worked out like the
propositional inductive theories of science. These theories, according to
Helmholtz’s account, specified with mathematical rigor their domain of
objects and then through meticulous accumulation of observations from
experiments drew conclusions about broad causal relations between them.
Though art was sufficient for generalizations that captured phenomenal
experience it was not so for scientific knowledge, which must be
6To illustrate this comparison Helmholtz cited the opposition between Goethe’s work in
optics and that of the community of experimental physicists, who all, “without exception,
agree” on the validity of Newtonian optics. The objective certainty of the Newtonian theory
was evident by the agreement of physicists based upon mathematical theorems that
could be shared and understood by all. Lacking communicability, a theory could not be
considered properly objective.
7For a fuller discussion of Helmholtz’s classical theory of aesthetics, see Hatfield 1994.
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demonstrably true everywhere and always, that is, objective. Helmholtz
accused Goethe’s artistic vision of tainting his work in science not by way
of active Romantic zeal but through the passivity that Schiller attributed to
“the naı̈ve poet.”8
Helmholtz’s 1892 paper, “On Goethe’s Anticipation of Subsequent
Scientific Researches,” differed in tone, but little in content. He continued
to consider artistic intuition a passive process through which the artist
grasped general truths about macrocosmic experience (Helmholtz 1892,
492). But he was less hostile to artistic cognition, admitting that intuitions
are often the first step in a scientific project, claiming even that art
was “another way, besides that of science, to acquire insight into the
complicated workings of nature” (Helmholtz 1892, 481). He argued
that in this respect Goethe anticipated certain contemporary scientific
theories and he cited the poet’s work as less precise anticipations of
his own theory of sensation and law of conservation of force (Helmholtz
1892, 495-99). Nevertheless, Helmholtz continued to distinguish scientific
work from that of the artist in virtue of the ability of the former to
reveal causal relations in terms of explicit laws. The two main points
of 1853–that scientific knowledge got at causal relations and that it
was expressed in explicit, communicable formulations–remained, with the
emphasis weighted differently so to portray Goethe in a more comradely
light.9 In both 1853 and 1892 Helmholtz bemoaned Goethe as a failed
scientist, not because his overly active, romantic will projected itself
onto his representations of nature, as one might have expected from
reading Daston and Galison’s discussion of the romantic subject and its
juxtaposition with the objective scientist. Rather, it was Goethe’s passive
observational approach, which simply assumed nature there as given,
8For more on this classification of Goethe and his relationship with Schiller see
Richards 2002, 430-34.
9There is the question of why Helmholtz would have changed at all in his portrayal of
Goethe between 1853 and 1892. This is a complex question that has been given much
scholarly attention. It is generally understood as a symptom of the wider metamorphosis
in Helmholtz’s thought. Some scholars attribute it to changing political conditions in
the German academia at the time. By the later half of the nineteenth century, science
was no longer the underdog in the universities, battling for pride of place in the stuffy
world of tradition that favoured more artistically inclined disciplines, including speculative
Naturphilosphie. The promotion of experimental science in academia and beyond had
been a wild success. So much so, argues Timothy Lenoir, that the re-appropriation
of Goethe can be attributed to a reaction on the part of moderate liberal scientists
like Helmholtz, to a crass and overly pragmatic ’Americanization’ of academia (Lenoir
1994, 172). Still other authors, like Gary Hatfield and Michael Heidelberger, look more
to the internal workings of Helmholtz’s thought, which see him reacting to new scientific
work and the tensions within his own epistemological position. Heidelberger’s analysis
of the development of Helmholtz’s notion of lawfulness is particularly useful here. See
Heidelberger 1994, especially sections II and III.
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that was the source of his scientific shortcomings. The artist assumed
that the truths of nature could be simply observed by a sufficiently
subtle mind, “Instead of trying to arrange the phenomena of nature under
definite conceptions, independent of intuition, he [Goethe] sits down to
contemplate them as he would a work of art, complete in itself, and certain
to yield up its central idea, sooner or later, to a sufficiently susceptible
student” (Helmholtz 1853, 45-46). In this, Helmholtz claimed that Goethe
shared a “secret affinity” with Hegel and Schelling (Helmholtz 1853, 46).
Here we glimpse what Helmholtz took to be the primary source of error
in the artistic approach to nature: the assumption that the mind has
open access to the world of phenomena, an assumption he attributed
also to the Naturphilosophen. In attributing this shared trespass to the
idealist, as exemplified by Hegel, and the Naturphilosoph as exemplified by
Schelling, Helmholtz seems to conflate two distinct philosophical positions
(Helmholtz 1853, 46). It should be noted that it is only a particular version
of Hegelian idealism that Helmholtz seems to take issue with. Michael
Heidelberger has argued convincingly that Helmholtz was importantly in
line with the Fichtean version of idealism (Heidelberger 1994, 482-91).
Helmholtz’s concerns do not lie with idealism and Naturphilosophie as
such, but rather with the idea that the mind has access to the world of
things through unanalyzed intuitions, which he sees the Hegelian idealist
and the Naturphilosoph as endorsing.
III. THE REAL IDEAL THREAT
Much has been written on Helmholtz’s campaign against idealist
philosophies of nature.10 From early on in his career he scorned
Naturphilosophie and all “speculative metaphysics” on the basis of what
he saw as their unwarranted and often false use of ideas in natural
science, such as the Lebenskraft of his Berlin teacher Johannes Müller.11
Helmholtz wrote to Emil Du Bois-Reymond in 1864, “Grown up among
the traditions of high-flown metaphysics, I have learned to value the
reality of facts in opposition to theoretical probabilities” (Lenoir 1997, 130).
Timothy Lenoir maintains that Helmholtz’s early work in physiology was
a “concerted attack” on the idea of a Lebenskraft, and that his 1847
“Memoir on the Conservation of Force” can be read as an assault on
similar assumptions. It was read that way at the time, as is clear from
its rejection as materialistic and democratic by some of the old guard in
German academia (Lenoir 1997, 130).
10See Lenoir 1997, “Politics of Vision,” Jurkowitz 2002, “Helmholtz and the Liberal
Unification of Science”, and Cahan 1994 “Civilizing Power of Science.”
11For more on Müller’s role in the lives of his students, see Jardine 1997.
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Helmholtz was not alone in his rebellion against the entrenched
dominance of Naturphilosophie. During his student years in Berlin,
he joined a Naturforscheverein–natural scientists’ club–where young
scientists such as Du Bois-Reymond, Rudolph Virchow, and Ernst Brücke
collectively swore against allowing any talk of vital forces to creep into
their work and instead adhered strictly to the lexicons of chemistry and
mechanics. These young men saw themselves as a reforming, if not
revolutionary, vanguard of an experimentalist science12 that was to be the
new foundation of German academia and that was to unify German society
under the banner of liberalism. They saw close connections between the
proper epistemological orientation for science and the social, political and
psychological requirements of a rationally ordered state (Jurkowitz 1997,
292). The question of how to be a properly objective scientist had political
implications for these budding scientists and continued to as their careers
unfolded. Their epistemic credos were largely built around a mission to
remove Naturphilosophie with its “reference to authority and unbounded
speculation” (Jurkowitz 1997, 292) from its position of privilege in German
academia and set experimental science in its place.
For Helmholtz, the fundamental methodological problem of
Naturphilosophie to be addressed by experimental science was the
unwarranted assumption of a correspondence between the knower
and the world, what he called a “pre-established harmony” (1862)13
between mind and nature. He saw the psychological doctrine of vitalism,
Naturphilosophie and (his reading of) Kantian philosophy to all be
variations on the theme of “philosophies of identity” (Helmholtz 1862,
125). Typified by Hegelian philosophy, the Naturphilosoph endorsed the
belief that “the human mind is able, without any guidance from external
experience, to think again the thoughts of the creator and to rediscover
them by its own inner activity” (Helmholtz 1862, 125). Not only was this
approach non-conducive to experimental science, it was seen as hubristic
and elitist, as it required a mind equal to that of Hegel or Goethe–a
condition that would not have encouraged a broadly collective empirical
project. Hegel’s own views, Helmholtz claimed, were only popular due to
their ability to amaze by way of “strange, abstract phraseology, which was
perhaps really understood by but a few of his worshippers” (Helmholtz
1862, 126). Like the leaf-like appendage of Goethe’s Urpflanze, Hegel’s
12With the complicated exception of Virchow, who promoted a more socially-based
medicine. See Jardine 1997.
13“Pre-established harmony” was not intended to invoke Leibnizian metaphysical
connotations but refer instead to the idea of a harmony between the mind of the knower
and the object of knowledge, built into the relationship between the two, and allowing the
former to access the latter without impediment.
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work was ultimately obscure and incommunicable. According to Helmholtz,
the artist was subject to the same epistemic vices as the Hegelian and
the Kantian who were all three guilty of assuming that the structures and
rules of the mind were present in macrocosmic nature and constitutive of
scientific knowledge.14
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS TO CURE A NATURPHILOSOPH
For the ills of Naturphilosophie Helmholtz prescribed the practices of
cultivating untiring patience, strict adherence to experimental methods,
and step-by-step reasoning that prevented jumping to conclusions. It was
only through the meticulous and patient conducting of tests that the
virtuous scientist could raise a mere hypothesis to the status of law through
the careful accumulation of evidence. These admonitions are reminiscent
of those associated with the mechanical objectivity identified by Daston
and Galison, whose proponents cautioned against interpretation and
imprinting pre-conceived notions upon data. By adhering to these virtues
the scientist could “let nature speak for itself” and get as close as possible
to certain, objective knowledge. These virtues suggest a concern for an
accurate scientific representation of the world and a notion of objectivity
that emphasized correspondence. Yet, for Helmholtz, there existed also
the virtues of structural objectivity.
Daston and Galison classify Helmholtz as a structural objectivist and
take his epistemology of signs to be an example of structural objectivity
(253). Helmholtz’s sign theory took phenomenal experience and empirical
knowledge to be built out of sensations that came through the sensory
apparatuses as signals or signs, as opposed to re-presentations or mirror
14Michael Heidelberger argues that it was not ideas per se that Helmholtz reviled but
rather, particular assumptions about the human mind’s ability to have direct purchase in
objective nature. Helmholtz’s work in physiology had taught him that scientists were not
justified in assuming that the world which caused the stimulations from which perceptions
were constructed, was anything like the perceptions themselves. However, experimental
science could afford actual, objective knowledge of the relations of things by discovering
what elements of phenomena were necessary always and everywhere. Formulating these
laws assumed certain ideas like force and matter, as Helmholtz did in his “Memoir.” An
objective scientist could assume certain ideas, but they had to be well justified. In his
earlier days, Kantian justifications of force and matter in terms of their necessity for doing
physics vindicated the use of those ideas, though they lacked direct experiential evidence.
Their assumption was additionally supported by the practical success of the physical
theory that resulted. After the 1860s Helmholtz lessened his reliance upon the Kantian
strategy and weighted the justification for ideas more heavily on the successful application
of the theories they allowed. Still, in neither case could it have been a ideas as such in
virtue of which Naturphilosophie was opposed to experimental science. The problem lay
in certain ideas, ones that assumed without warrant a correspondence between mind and
phenomenal world. See Heidelberger 1994, esp. 493-94.
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images of the world.15 He wrote, “our sensations are but for us only
symbols of the objects of the external world, and correspond to them
only in some such way as written characters or articulate words to the
things they denote” (Helmholtz 1853, 54). He took the relationship between
sensational signs and their objective stimulators to be a causal one and the
task of science to obtain knowledge of objective relations by translating
back from perceptions to the invariances that held between objects. The
scientific project strove to translate back to the objective structure of
things from the relations in experience.16 The language of phenomena,
which included such concepts as a Lebenskraft, was unsuited to objective
science. The vocabularies of experience contained many inaccuracies and
varied between persons. Helmholtz understood his own investigations to
have contributed evidence to this epistemological position–in the “Facts
in Perception” he argued that what recent physiology showed was that
the mode of sensation (and the quotidian vocabularies used to talk about
them) did not necessarily correspond to modes of stimuli in the external
world. Rather it was, for example, in the case of sensations of tone, the
length of the sound wave that determined whether it was a sound or
a tactile sensation of vibrations. The categories of our experience were
not necessarily the objective categories of the world. Only in precise
measurements that applied everywhere and always, irrespective of the
sensory organ in question, could one be confident of the objective validity
of judgments about sensations. Writ large on the level of epistemology
this meant that only abstract relations of signs got beyond subjective
experience into the world: the sign theory was intended as a solution to
the problem of epistemic access.
Helmholtz was indeed committed to the ethos of structural objectivity,
and we may interpret the greater emphasis on communicability in the later
Goethe paper as a shift in the weighting of his epistemic virtues even
more towards those of structural objectivity. However, contra to the picture
offered by Daston and Galison, who depict him as committed solely to
structural objectivity, a closer look at his set of epistemic virtues reveal
that during his career he espoused and practiced norms characteristic of
both mechanical and structural objectivity.
This is a minor point, as Daston and Galison do not insist that structural
objectivity arose purely out of the ashes of mechanical, but allow that both
these ethics had their adherents at the end of the nineteenth century
(50). The more interesting claims that I wish to make in light of what
15This differs significantly from both the Kantian and Goethean conceptions of the
relationship between the knower and known.
16I want to emphasize the sense of striving here–for Helmholtz there was no guarantee
of achieving correspondence.
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has been said about Helmholtz is to suggest that at least one variety
of nineteenth-century objectivity arose not from concerns about or in
response to a new, active conception of the subject, but from a complex
of factors that suggest that the history of objectivity must look beyond
philosophical conceptions of the self for the whole story.
In their discussion of the rise of objectivity Daston and Galison claim
that the new credo was a response to, and was made possible by the
emergence of:
The post-Kantian self [. . . ] active, integrated, and [. . . ]
Organized around the dynamic and autonomous will, the self
acted on the world, projecting itself outward [. . . ] This is the
subjective self of Idealist philosophy, Romantic art, and, as
James bears witness, early experimental psychology: a self–a
“subject”–equal to and opposed to the objective world. (201)
In light of what has been said regarding Helmholtz’s concerns about
Goethe and the idealism of Naturphilosophie, I question whether the
artistic, Kantian and idealist selves can be grouped against the scientific
self on the basis of an active-passive distinction and whether the
nineteenth-century move to objectivity is best understood as a response
to the threat of an active subject.
According to Daston and Galison, the subjective menace was, “viewed
as overactive and prone to impose its preconceptions and pet hypotheses
on data” (203) and was represented in the artist as, “authentic, recreating
the world in the image of an assertive and indelible self” (246). Daston
and Galison take Helmholtz’s views on Goethe to be apologetics for active
transgressions of this sort. However, I hope that the preceding discussion
establishes that Helmhotlz was not kept awake at night by the thought
of Goethe qua Romantic in this sense, but Goethe qua naı̈ve poet with
naturphilosophisch assumptions. And it was not a matter of Goethe’s
active re-imaging of the world that would have caused this insomnia.
The argument in Objectivity groups the artist and the idealist together
by distinguishing them from earlier passive conceptions of the self
characteristic of Enlightenment psychology (199). The threat to knowledge
from the scientific self for Locke and other eighteenth-century philosophers
of mind was its nature as a passive conglomeration of faculties that
simply accepted, and was often fooled by its environment (199). The
authors claim that after Kant this was no longer the threat. Yet, this did
not seem to be the case for Helmholtz, whose worries about Goethe’s
complacent artistic intuition looked rather like those that would have
plagued Locke. Helmholtz’s theory of signs was designed to deal with
the concern of accurate epistemic access to the world while remaining
190 Spontaneous Generations 3:1(2009)
Hallet On the Subject of Goethe
true to findings in sensory physiology that revealed our cognitive-sensory
apparatuses as potentially misleading. Of course eighteenth-century
psychologists were not the only ones concerned with issues about the
correspondence of ideas to reality–I’ve already noted that so too were
those committed to mechanical objectivity. But the latter group had
concerns of a different nature, about an active mind tainting scientific
descriptions as opposed to a passive complacent acceptance of the
world as presented–the difference may be conceived as that between
self-deception and being deceived. Helmholtz’s worries resemble those
of eighteenth-century psychologists with respect to passive subjects but
he is still working with a fundamentally different theory of the mind and of
the subject and is motivated by very different social-political concerns. It
would seem that the story of objectivity in the nineteenth century is not
one of a straight-forward break from the eighteenth century nor is it a
simple reinterpretation of past concerns, but is rather a more complicated
narrative. Various threads feed into Helmholtz’s worries about scientific
methods and objectives and they do not easily reduce to concerns over
the threat of a particular philosophical conception of the willful self.
V. ANOTHER MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF OBJECTIVITY
Helmholtz’s worries about Goethe suggest another way to understand
the threat from subjectivity in which the investigator, be they the
extraordinary artist or Naturphilosoph, problematically assumed that their
unaided intellect was sufficient for extracting knowledge of nature. This is
a highly moralized framing of the problem, the self on offer here is not
metaphysical-philosophical but resides on a more practical-moral level. It
captures elements common to the romantic artist as portrayed by Daston
and Galison, and to Goethe and the idealist as understood by Helmholtz.
The same peremptory self-assurance that Helmholtz attributed to Goethe
and the Naturphilosophen may be attributed to the romantic artist as
depicted in Objectivity–both scorn the experimental method and take their
own mind to be sufficient for accessing truths of nature. This hubristic
nonchalance is neither strictly active nor passive but could be expressed
either way–the romantic artist, as characterized by Daston and Galison,
was highly active, shaping his vistas of the nature according to his will,
while the naı̈ve poet was characterized by both Schiller and Helmholtz as
a passive spectator who grasps nature through the power of his unaided
mind. Whether or not these are legitimate characterizations of Goethe or
any romantic is less important for our purposes than the degree to which
they were understood by scientists to pose a threat to proper scientific
pursuits. Both were interpreted as constitutive of a threat to scientific
objectivity in virtue of their shared disrespect for the humility and hard work
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that was needed for scientific knowledge. This de-coupling of the epistemic
anxieties and virtues along the lines of activity and passivity suggests that
there is more going on in the rise of objectivity in the nineteenth century
than Daston and Galison present.
I take it to be the case that for at least one prominent nineteenth-century
scientist the threat of an active post-Kantian self was not the catalyst for
a turn to objectivity. The dangers of subjectivity for Helmholtz and his
anti-idealist colleagues sprang from a conception of an overly self-assured
subject that threatened to render science obscurantist and elitist and
cause it to stray from its experimental roots. This provoked a turn to
a variegated set of epistemic virtues that included admonitions from
both mechanical and structural objectivity, indicating a de-coupling of the
epistemic anxieties and virtues as presented by Daston and Galison. This
threat cannot be disentangled from the situation of mid-nineteenth-century
German science, The work of scholars such as Timothy Lenoir, David
Cahan and Nicholas Jardine shows us that Helmholtz and his peers
were inspired by a social agenda to replace grammar and the classics
with mathematics and science as the foundation of German education
and push a liberal agenda on a broader political scale.17 This agenda
was entangled with the images of the idealist and artist as I have here
described them and together provoked a turn to a variegated set of
epistemic virtues. For Helmholtz, at least, the prominence of philosophies
of identity in German science, contemporary scientific research, and the
desire to build a liberal society on scientific-rational grounds pushed him
to adopt aspects of mechanical and structural objectivity whilst retaining
worries about a passive self similar to those of his eighteenth-century
predecessors. It does not seem that the threat of the Kantian subject was
the primary motivator in his turn to objectivity.
I would suggest that this calls for a re-evaluation of the claim, made
by Daston and Galison, that objectivity can be understood through the
rise of a particular kind of self, the post-Kantian subject. Daston and
Galison’s methodology aims to describe the history of objectivity through
the history of philosophical conceptions of the self. If we take Helmholtz as
a case study of a nineteenth-century scientist concerned with objectivity,
his variegated set of motivating concerns and ways of addressing them
suggests that the history of objectivity requires more than reference to
the history of subjectivity for its explication. The subject of Idealism and
the subject of the naı̈ve poet were importantly distinct from the willful
subject as typified by the romantic artist, and each inspired different
combinations of epistemic virtues. The particular conception of the subject
that most worried Helmholtz and his peers was partially determined by
17See Cahan 1994, Jardine 1997, Lenoir 1997.
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the professional and political situations that they found themselves in.
Understanding some of the motivating concerns for Helmholtz’s science
and his philosophical foundations for science demonstrates how many
and varied are the elements that went into the emergence of objectivity
in the nineteenth century. If we do not sufficiently recognize that the
contributing factors to the conception and development of epistemic virtues
are many and multi-leveled, we will get an impoverished understanding of
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